August 18, 2020—"Inching Toward A Space Force!”

The inaugural Space Capstone Publication, Spacepower (SCP), is the first United States Space Force (USSF) articulation of doctrine for its independent theory of spacepower.

Click here for this first formal U.S. Space Force (USSF) publication intended to address: “Why spacepower is vital for our Nation, how military spacepower is employed, who military space forces are, and what military space forces value.” It is intended to be the foundation upon which to build the professional body of knowledge for forging an independent military Service committed to space operations.

General John “Jay” Raymond, Commander of U.S. Space Command, explained in the Forward to this June 2020 publication, publicly released on August 10, 2020, that the SCP is intended to answer “why spacepower is vital for our Nation, how military spacepower is employed, who military space forces are, and what military space forces value.”

The CSP is intended to be a foundation of a professional body of knowledge to guide the formation of an independent military Service committed to space operations. As General Raymond noted it will remain “subject to the policies and strategies” that govern the Space Force employment, intended to embody “deterrent and coercive capacities” to provide independent options for National and Joint leadership especially “when integrated with other forms of military power.”

As such, the CSP is intended to foster integration with the Air Force, Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard to achieve interdependence and “unlock spacepower’s full potential,” with “agility, innovation, and boldness.” General Raymond emphasized that these traits are intended to pioneer a new Service and a new professional body of knowledge. The capstone doctrine is intended to be a point-of-departure toward that goal, not a final adjudication, in evolving efforts to critique, debate and improve.

Such public discussion has begun, including some issues that are longstanding concerns — such as those that stem from the ambiguous definition of “space” itself.

For example, military systems first transited “space” during World War II when the German V-2 ballistic missiles wreaked havoc on London. (The SCUD missiles used to attack Israel and Saudi Arabia in the 1991 Gulf War were descendants of the V-2, still are on the market for terrorists today.)

German engineers who developed the V-2, later led the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in the Soviet Union and the United States — and those same ICBMs were used to deploy Soviet Sputnik and U.S. Explorer-1 satellites in 1957 and 58.

Werner Von Braun, who led the German Team and later our early ballistic missile development activities especially in Huntsville, Alabama, later led the development of our space launchers when NASA was formed for the “peaceful” exploration of space. Meanwhile, the Air Force abandoned its early efforts to develop and deploy defenses against ballistic missiles; deferring that mission to the Army, especially in Huntsville, to focus on the development and deployment of ICBMs — and especially space-based sensors.

Those USAF space activities were initiated by General Bernard “Benny” Schriever — and a brand new team established in Southern California. Key to his Atlas, Titan and Minuteman development and deployment activities was USAF General Sam Phillips, who led the development of the staging technology that was essential in meeting President Kennedy’s May 25, 1961 challenge to land a man on the Moon and to return him safely to Earth by the end of the 1960s — he led the Apollo Team that achieved that goal ahead of schedule.

Thus, the Army and Air Force space activities have been apparent for decades. Indeed, General Schriever served in the Army Air Corps before and during World War II. And his key “lieutenant,” General Sam Phillips, also served in the Army Air Corps during World War II.

While the Navy connection is less apparent, the Navy has been involved in exploring space from the beginning. Its Vanguard program lost out to the Army’s (Von Braun’s) Redstone efforts in placing our first satellite in orbit — but it also has been active in developing, deploying and operating satellites and its sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) since the late fifties — and it has played a very important role in the once super-secret National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) that has played a key intelligence gathering role since it was formed in1961.

Thus, it should not surprise anyone that there may be some discord in assigning “Space Force” roles, especially from the various long-existing service responsibilities, authorities and operations. And I didn’t mean to leave out the Marines — recall that John Glenn, our first astronaut to orbit the Earth, was a Marine.

And the fact that the U.S. Space Force is currently embedded in the U.S. Air Force does not preclude the constructive involvement of the other services.

That constructive interservice history is a major part of the challenge — one that is, in my opinion as articulated earlier, made more difficult than it would have been if the U.S. Space Force had been set up as a separate service from the outset. Click here for my December 10, 2019 message that discusses that history. It will be interesting to see how long it will take for the ”powers that be” to see the merits of a separate service — recall it took World War II to make that case clearly enough for those “powers that were” to set up a separate USAF from the Army Air Corps.

But I digress . . .

Click here for an example of the Rachael Cohen’s Air Force Magazine discussion that “Space Force Doctrine Raises Questions about Nuclear Missiles.” She raises questions about who should be responsible for sub-orbital space missions — e.g., ICBMs and SLBMs as well as shorter range ballistic missiles — as distinguished from orbital missions.

She quotes Col. Casey Beard, commander of the operational group Space Delta 9 at Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado, as saying the Space Force is responsible for defining the physical and operational characteristics for space . . . i.e., “The Air Force has a small contingent of land and maritime capabilities, and the Army and Navy have air assets . . . However, the Air Force is the only service designed and optimized for the air domain and is therefore responsible for defining that domain’s physical and operational characteristics for the Joint Force, just as the USSF now is for space.”

Somehow, I doubt that clarification will end likely continuing interservice disputes. And among that set of disputes, I expect there will be important USAF and USSF disputes — to be mediated by the Secretary of the Air Force???

Also, as Ms. Cohen notes, there may be a reconstruction of arguments previously settled — she mentions a question of who should be responsible for the ICBMs — the Army or the Air Force?

And I would add ballistic missile defense (BMD) — if ever the Air Force is inclined to take seriously its potential role for providing air-based and especially space-based BMD systems.

And will there be a line drawn between space-based defenses in orbit or in deeper space? When will that problem be decided — and who should be the “decider?”

Then there are other interesting questions, like who should decide on the ranks among the Space Force. Click here for the view of Retired USAF General David Deptula in his August 16, 2020 The Hill article, “Let the Space Force Decide Its Own Ranks.”

Sounds right … though the USSF is embedded in the USAF and USAF General Deptula’s article appears to have been prompted to counter an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for 2021 (NDAA(2021), proposed by Rep. Dan Crenshaw (R-Texas), a proud Navy hero, and that amendment would require the newly established space orbiteers to use Navy ranks and grades. Stay tuned.

Finally, I want to again repeat previous observations that while we consider these issues of what should compose the mission of the Space Force (that I support), we must not forget the threats that already confront us and those threats that space elements of our future military capabilities must confront.

Click here for my March 10, 2020 message which quotes then Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USDRE) Mike Griffin as stating: “The U.S. can’t wish away great power competition with Russia and China, and it needs to get serious in structuring for it over the long-term . . . Space defense, for example, despite boasting a new service and new thinking, is still oriented toward outmoded ideas.” Mike also emphasized that the threat from Russia’s and China’s hypersonic weapons is particularly tough to counter. With those thoughts in mind, I again emphasize several points I believe still reflect Mike’s point-of-view — though I have not coordinated them with him:

Since the early 1990s, inadequate U.S. research has not provided a U.S. advantage in the 21st century. Preoccupation with wars in the Middle East that were “important, but not existential” threats and led to too little being spent on leap-ahead and stay-ahead technologies; so Russia and China took advantage of the opportunity to steal a march on the U.S. Those countries, and others on the rise, “don’t respect Western values” and are challenging the U.S. and its ideology. Western liberal democracy, “Western thought, is under attack.” U.S. adversaries do not share values such as “the rule of law, property rights of individuals, the right to freedom of movement, the right to free markets, and many other things.”
We need to accept that we are once again in a Great Power Competition, and invest accordingly. . . As Mike Griffin said, “It won’t be easy convincing the nation the situation has changed, but I believe we will step up.” That’s why he said he took the USDRE job, which regrettably he recently left — I hope that doesn’t mean that our Defense Department leadership has decided not to step up to that important task.
In any case, I agree with Dr. Griffin’s assessment that we must rethink our space architecture — an important challenge for the new Space Force. As he emphasized in a public statement:
- “We have the architecture I would design if we didn’t have a threat. But in case anyone hadn’t noticed, we have adversaries and we have a threat to our architecture, and so we need, above all else, to be far more resilient, because space is absolutely critical to everything about the way the United States fights wars.” . . . “America’s space architecture still consists “of a relatively few very high value, extraordinarily exquisite, unbelievably capable space assets.” For which, “the other name is targets to the adversary.”
- “We cannot give the adversaries even the faintest idea that they could disable our space architecture. So we need proliferation,” and not just in low-earth orbit. We need “to proliferate in all orbits, with assets that are individually lower-value but collectively very high value, so that they don’t give the adversary a …desirable aimpoint.”
China poses a particularly important threat. Griffin emphasized that China’s hypersonic weapons threat is “real and increasing.” “They outrun and out-range our best radars. We have to be prepared to deal with raids of not one and two, but many”… which “We can do.”
- “You will not hit a target that you cannot see.” Until the U.S. can spot and track “dim upper stages without being dependent on exquisite radar assets, we will be concerned.” Chinese hypersonic weapons are “20 times dimmer, or more, than the targets we are able to track” with the Space-Based Infrared System, or SBIRS. Adding more “exquisite” radars is either not an option or would only create more targets for an adversary. Thus, the U.S. “can only do the target acquisition and fire control problem from space … We need to be closer to the action, or we need very large optics, which, again, creates more high-value targets.”

Finally, Griffin said allies can play a big role in technology development. “To defend those values requires not just the United States as the Lone Ranger, with maybe some sidekicks, but really, full and open partnerships, and we are working with allies on many of these technology areas.” Most, he said, he cannot discuss, but “it is incredibly valuable. … We wouldn’t succeed without our allies and partners.”

Sure sounds like reinventing Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). To which I say, “Amen” and “Amen.” And by the way, Mike Griffin played an important role in the SDI era (1984-93), which ended when the Defense Secretary Les Aspin, as he boasted, “took the stars out of Star Wars.” And while I agree that “we can’t hit what we can’t see” is a good reason for space-based sensors, I would argue we also need weapons in space to effectively hit all that we can see.

But will it come to be?

To focus on indicators of this hoped for prospect, keep an eye on the Space Development Agency (SDA) and its efforts to exploit technology advancing in the private sector to accomplish important Space Force missions much more rapidly than the Pentagon’s normal acquisition process. This doable mission — as was demonstrated by Ronald Reagan’s SDI three decades ago — will tell the tale; and, along the way, have a major impact on the capabilities of the U.S. Space Force.

Click here for my June 30, 2020 discussion of such SDA and related prospects. As evidence to justify such a goal, click here for my June 11, 2019 discussion of how Elon Musk’s SpaceX initiatives are setting the stage for such a revival especially with a constellation of thousands of low altitude satellites to provide world-wide internet-web capabilities (and also further space initiatives, including to support a return to the Moon and a mission to Mars).

And Jeff Bezos is also entering the fray. Click here for a report that the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) recently approved the launch of over 3,000 low-altitude satellites by e-commerce giant Amazon to compose a global internet network. And Facebook is also reportedly developing its own internet constellation.

Notably, there are even more recent reports describing how a proliferated low altitude systems of space-based sensors can enable a capability of shooting down hypersonic missiles — addressing the issue that “You can’t shoot down what you can’t see.”

Click here, for example, and ask yourself: “If you can see hypersonic missiles from space, why not also shoot them down from space?”

Sounds like reason enough to re-invent the space-based defense systems considered during the SDI era, now empowered with modern sensors and miniature thruster rockets — and advanced directed energy capabilities. And use today’s commercially maturing technology, just as Ronald Reagan’s SDI did with then existing technology thirty years ago.

The Pentagon’s top acquisition authorities then approved demonstration and validation of a system of 1000 such small interceptors called Brilliant Pebbles, then expected to cost $10 billion to develop, deploy and operate for 20-years — now inflated to $20 billion. How about that as a challenge for Musk and Bezos — and others???

Bottom Lines.

We live in a very dangerous world — actually, the most dangerous I can recall, and I remember World War II.

Our national security policies leave much to be desired…and seem to have regressed when it comes to our overall policies related to protecting the American people, especially from missile attack. That regression is related to the policies of previous administrations, but whether Trump administration administration’s Space Force will reverse that course is yet to be seen.

There are hints of a revival of the most important technology pioneered by Reagan’s SDI efforts to provide the most cost-effective BMD systems, but that conclusion is not yet justified as President Trump’s Space Force “inches ahead.” Stay tuned.

What can you do?

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