October 15, 2019—Reykjavik Lessons for Today!

“Gorbachev said he could not do it. If they could agree to ban research in space, he would sign in two minutes. They should add to the text ‘The testing in space of all space components of missile defense is prohibited, except research and testing conducting in laboratories’ . . .” Authoritative Memcon from Reykjavik Summit, October 12, 1986

Last Friday and Saturday was the 33^rd anniversary of President Ronald Reagan’s historic meeting with Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland to plan a major summit, but that meeting itself was far more important than many previous or subsequent summits. It actually was an “unplanned summit that changed the world.”

Click here for my last year’s anniversary message elaborating that fact, noting that it became a historically pivotal moment in our Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) with the Soviet Union.

Although the Reykjavik “summit” was billed as a failure around the world, it actually changed everything in our Geneva negotiations, and the consequences are important to this day. The key moment came near the end of the talks after the President had achieved many of his objectives for an agreement including deep reductions in offensive nuclear forces.

At that last moment, Gorbachev made that agreement contingent on the President agreeing to limit our space-based defense research and experiments to the laboratory, rather than in space — as indicated in my above quotation from the negotiating record. That would have gutted the President’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) — and President Reagan refused. The below photo illustrates Reagan’s and Gorbachev’s disappointment as they left Hofdi House to end the “meeting to plan a summit.”

Before flying back to Washington, President Reagan said of their 11 hours of negotiations, including the final unscheduled meeting that ended in stalemate: “We moved towards agreement on drastically reduced numbers of intermediate-range missiles in both Europe and Asia and sharply reducing our strategic arsenals for both . . . We made progress in the area of nuclear testing, but there was remaining at the end of our talks one area of disagreement.”

He had agreed to limit research and experiments on his space-based missile defense system to the terms of the ABM Treaty for a decade, but wanted a definite plan to deploy it after then — but he refused to limit those activities to the laboratory as Gorbachev demanded, as noted above.

His conditions became explicit objectives in our Defense and Space Talks (DST) that had begun in March 1985. We were prepared to conduct our research on space-based defenses consistent with the ABM Treaty for 10 years and sought the right to deploy afterward.

Moreover, we actually achieved agreement on specific language at the December 8-10, 1987 Washington Summit, as we concluded the much heralded INF Treaty from which President Trump recently withdrew because the Russians had violated its terms.

But at the conclusion of the 1987 Summit, that DST agreement was undermined by some of our leaders who no doubt did not understand what they were doing.

They basically publicly claimed that language we negotiators had agreed on did not really mean what the Soviets had agreed it meant — that we would have the right to deploy space based defenses after a decade of continuing to abide by the terms of AMB Treaty. (Note, that was over three decades ago.)

And, of course, the Soviets backtracked on that DST agreement and stonewalled us for the remainder of our talks in Geneva.

But Gorbachev had made many concessions in Reykjavik toward our position on offensive nuclear arms — to ban all INF systems and cut the START systems in half — and as the planned session neared an end, he demanded that our space experiments be limited to the laboratory. We pocketed the Soviet concessions on offensive nuclear arms, but rejected the Soviet demand that would have gutted SDI efforts.

Reagan’s priority was to explore the most truly effective defenses that would be based in space, as we have understood since the conclusions of the Defense Advanced Research Agency (DARPA) studies in the early 1960s. SDI was all about determining whether late-1980s technology would make that objective possible.

In late 1990, we actually determined that the answer was clearly, “Yes” — and the SDI experiments were clearly demonstrating that was so — and the Soviets knew they could not compete with our technological capabilities that would neuter their advantage in offensive ballistic missiles.

In short, President Reagan walked out and subsequently we were able to keep and expand on the concessions Gorbachev had made in concluding our INF and START Treaties — the first ever actually to reduce nuclear weapons, while our SDI efforts continued to press the technological advances to eventually build truly cost-effective space based defenses — at least through the remainder of the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations.

But then in early 1993, the Clinton administration completely gutted those efforts and no administration since has taken advantage of the key SDI technologies that made space-based interceptors viable a quarter century ago.

Hopefully, the Trump administration will reverse this truly terrible decision by reviving the most cost-effective missile defense system of the SDI era (1983-93), Brilliant Pebbles.

I have repeatedly reported on the opportunities that we knew were possible in the late 1980s — and that the Pentagon’s top Acquisition Executive n 1990 approved a fully funded Demonstration and Validation (DemVal) program to prove that then existing technology could meet that objective.

Click here and here for my two most recent Newsmax articles that emphasize that solution should be revived as an alternative to the Next Generation Interceptor program being emphasized and explored by the Pentagon. Both articles, repeated is full below, were in response to two important Forbes’ articles by Loren Thompson, CEO of the Lexington Institute as indicated and also linked to below.

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How About Building the Defenses We Need — ASAP

By Henry F. Cooper, Newsmax, October 4, 2019 https://www.newsmax.com/henryfcooper/aegis-gmd-brilliant-pebbles/2019/10/04/id/935737/#ixzz61nYKBuXY

Loren Thompson, Lexington Institute CEO, aptly observed in a recent Forbes article that our current Ground-based Missile Defense (GMD) system and plans for its improvement do not provide much confidence for protecting the U.S. homeland — and that we need urgently to respond to the growing threat.

I agree with his assessment of our current situation and plans, but not with his recommendation to spend a lot of money to improve the current GMD system in Alaska and California. We need to keep what we have until we can do better, of course. But we have much better — and less costly — alternatives to what I know of the so called “Next Generation Interceptor.” Those alternatives can rapidly provide added needed better ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability. Moreover, we have long understood those technical possibilities but have not exercised them — for political rather than technical reasons.

That past record should change!

Our near-term added homeland defenses can be much improved by simply training the crews of our Aegis BMD destroyers and cruisers to exploit their inherent capability in their normal operations areas, especially near and in our coastal waters (and in port). Though the “powers that be” have long been informed of this possibility, little has been done to exploit it. Now, we have about 40 such ships deployed around the world — and operational ground-based “Aegis Ashore” BMD systems in Romania and Poland, which could also be deployed at appropriate locations in the continental U.S.

I understand that such Aegis Ashore operations may be planned for protecting Hawaii, by exploiting the Kauai test range capability that has supported Aegis BMD operational tests for years. And Japan is purchasing this capability for its homeland defense. This Aegis Ashore capability also could protect the continental United States, especially from attacks from our relatively undefended South — e.g., by ballistic missiles launched from vessels in the Gulf of Mexico. Such a homeland defense capability could be quite affordably and rapidly deployed on U.S. military bases around the Gulf of Mexico.

In the longer term, a much more cost-effective BMD system can be rapidly developed and deployed in space — this capability was pioneered by President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The first SDI Director, Retired USAF Lt. Gen. James A. Abrahamson, joined me over two years ago to emphasize this important current possibility that we pioneered over 30 years ago. In 1990, it became a formal, fully justified and approved Major Defense Acquisition Program.

That Brilliant Pebbles system was expected to cost $10-billion in 1988 dollars — now inflated to $20-billion — for full development, deployment, and 20-years operations. It was designed to intercept attacking ballistic missiles in their boost-phase while their rockets still burn, before they can release their decoys and other countermeasures — and throughout their flight, including high in the atmosphere on re-entry. After surviving rigorous critical reviews, by both Pentagon and outside highly qualified and widely recognized expert technologists, it was disbanded by the Clinton Administration in early 1993 — and ignored ever since.

It’s long past time to revive that 30-year old concept, now with even more advanced technology, that should be even less costly. Based on that past experience, I believe we could deploy an operational capability within five years, if fully funded. Such an initiative should be included in the deliberations of the Pentagon’s new leadership as they implement President Trump’s Space Force. In particular, Gen. John Hyten, recently sworn in as the Joint Chief’s Vice Chairman, is well placed to lead such a renovation. As former Commander of Strategic Command and Space Command, he is well prepared to meet this challenge.

Stay tuned!

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Interceptor Needs Work in Efficiency, Cost-Effectiveness

By Henry F. Cooper, Newsmax, Thursday, October 10, 2019 https://www.newsmax.com/henryfcooper/brilliant-pebbles-sdi-mdap-bmd/2019/10/10/id/936557/

My Newsmax Article last week agreed that Loren B. Thompson had correctly observed that the Pentagon’s programs were deficient for improving our current Ground-based Missile Defense (GMD), but argued that we have better less expensive alternatives that can be deployed sooner than the undefined so-called Next Generation Interceptor.

I respect Dr. Thompson, and his views deserve serious attention. But given my longtime association with missile defense issues, I dispute some of his observations.

For example, one of my recommended alternative approaches contradicts his argument that our current GMD is our only system “capable of intercepting long-range ballistic missiles headed for America.”

My second recommended alternative was a more capable, less expensive ballistic missile defense (BMD) system than the Next Generation Interceptor Thompson described — and we can build it sooner.

Thompson’s Oct. 8, 2019 Forbes follow-on article, “Inside The U.S. Missile Defense Agency’s Secret Next Generation Interceptor,” reported that it will carry multiple defensive kill vehicles to intercept multiple attacking warheads our adversaries may deploy to overcome our existing defenses.

If true, this moves in the right direction — but we know how to do better. Consider a few more facts about my previous recommendations.

First, our sea-based BMD system — now deployed on about 40 Aegis destroyers and cruisers around the world (and that number could double in the future) can intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), if their crews are trained and ready.

The Navy has intercepted ballistic missiles above the atmosphere while they are still rising in their ascent phase. And in 2008, the operational crew of the USS Lake Erie, an Aegis BMD Cruiser, shot down a satellite orbiting faster than an ICBM traversing outer space.

So, our Aegis BMD ships can intercept ICBMs above the atmosphere.

Our Navy crews just need to train to exploit fully this capability if it arises during their normal operations—especially when near or in our coastal waters. But this capability already exists, if we have the wit to exploit it.

And as noted last week, Aegis BMD components can be deployed in a ground-based mode to help defend America, just as Aegis Ashore sites now protect our allies in Romania and Poland.

These systems, like all other BMD systems that intercept attacking ballistic missiles in outer space, potentially must defeat daunting offensive countermeasures — especially including numerous light weight decoys, difficult to distinguish from threat warheads.

As best as I can see, the Next Generation Interceptor will have this same problem when we actually get it in 6-10 years if Thompson’s Oct. 8 article correctly reflects the government’s optimistic plans and if its development goes well.

For my part, I would rather bet on meeting that schedule with a space-based BMD concept that 30 years ago survived exhaustive technical reviews within the Pentagon and by outside highly qualified skeptical technologists.

And in 1990, the Pentagon’s top acquisition executive approved Brilliant Pebbles as a Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) to enter a concept demonstration and validation (DemVal) phase.

Unlike the concepts Thompson indicated are now being considered, Brilliant Pebbles was designed to intercept ballistic missiles during their “boost phase” while their rockets still burn as they rise from their launch pads, before they can release decoys and other offensive countermeasures to defeat defensive systems.

Such a boost-phase intercept capability is clearly needed — and the earliest way to achieve it is to launch interceptors from aircraft, either fighter planes or drones. Hopefully, current programs are developing this important capability.

Brilliant Pebbles could provide this capability — and also intercept attacking missiles above the atmosphere if the countermeasure problem can be solved.

Moreover, 1991-1992 testing demonstrated that Brilliant Pebbles could intercept them after they reenter the atmosphere and high-altitude atmospheric drag strips away light weight decoys.

Thus, our Brilliant Pebbles targeting strategy gave first priority to boost-phase intercept, next to intercept high-altitude attacking warheads as they re-entered the atmosphere and third to exo-atmospheric (above the atmosphere) intercept if offensive countermeasures could be defeated.

Neither of the top two priorities could be met by the Next Generation Interceptor as described by Thompson. But ground-based interceptors also could be given a capability to intercept attacking warheads as they re-enter high in the atmosphere.

The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) considered developing such a possibility on my watch as SDI Director — and was dropped as funding was limited to meet congressional directives in the 1992 National Defense Authorization Act.

The Next Generation Interceptor effort should include such a possibility.

This SDI era should be of current interest and was discussed in considerable detail by the SDI Historian, Donald Baucom, in his “Rise and Fall of Brilliant Pebbles.”

In any case, I doubt the Next Generation Interceptor, as described by Dr. Thompson, can achieve anything like the global capabilities of a constellation of 1000 Brilliant Pebbles, nor meet the Pentagon-approved 1990 cost estimate to develop, deploy and operate that constellation for 20 years — $10 billion in 1989 dollars, about $20 billion in today’s dollars.

Hopefully, this challenge will be pursued by Defense Undersecretary for Research and Engineering Michael Griffin, who knows this history as a key participant in the SDI era.

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Click here for links to previous High Frontier messages that I have written on Brilliant Pebbles, the most important product of the SDI decade, 1983-93.

Three decades ago, we knew how to build such a global defenses with 1000 Brilliant Pebbles, credibly costed at $10 billion in 1988 dollars — now inflated to $20 billion — for development, deployment and 20-years operation. We should “go back to the future.”

Bottom Lines:

Many believe that President Reagan’s commitment to SDI at the Reykjavik Summit was the turning point in ending the Cold War. Amb. Vernon Walters, then our UN Ambassador, told me at the time that Soviet Marshal Akhromeyev said that Reykjavik was a “watershed event.” He ought to have known, as he led the Soviet experts group at Reykjavik. Many other former Soviet leaders have pointed to Reykjavik and Reagan’s SDI commitment as key to ending the Soviet Union and freeing millions throughout previously Soviet-controlled Europe.

And President Reagan’s partner, Britain’s Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher most memorably told an assembled group of SDI physicists and engineers when she met with us at the National Test Facility in Colorado Springs on August 3, 1990: “I firmly believe that it was the determination to embark upon the SDI program and to continue it that convinced the Soviet Union that they could never, never, never achieve their aim by military means because they would never succeed.”

Then, she added prophetic words, very pertinent today as we play catchup because we have let our SDI-related activities atrophy: “We must always keep our defenses sharp and we must always keep our technology well ahead.”

Regrettably, the best of Reagan’s top priority SDI program ended with the end of the George H.W. Bush administration and has remained dormant ever since — while its associated technology has advanced and is now being exploited by others, including especially China. It’s long past time to revive Reagan’s SDI vision and his commitment to building the most cost-effective ballistic missile defenses — those based in space.

President Trump’s initiative to build a Space Force can reset the record and recover from almost three decades that have ignored this most cost-effective way to protect the American people and our overseas troops, friends and allies.

At Reykjavik, President Reagan demanded a decade of research and experimentation on such space defenses in exchange for the offensive reductions — and now it has been over three decades since then.

We should return to what the Gipper wanted from the beginning! Before China beats us there!

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